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Abstract. Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski et al.
(ICS 2010) as coding schemes that protect a message against tamper-
ing attacks. Roughly speaking, a code is non-malleable if decoding an
adversarially tampered encoding of a message m produces the original
message m or a value m ′ (possibly ⊥) completely unrelated to m . It is
known that non-malleability is possible only for restricted classes of tam-
pering functions. Since their introduction, a long line of works has estab-
lished feasibility results of non-malleable codes against different families
of tampering functions. However, for many interesting families the chal-
lenge of finding “good” non-malleable codes remains open. In particular,
we would like to have explicit constructions of non-malleable codes with
high-rate and efficient encoding/decoding algorithms (i.e. low computa-
tional complexity). In this work we present two explicit constructions: the
first one is a natural generalization of the work of Dziembowski et al. and
gives rise to the first constant-rate non-malleable code with linear-time
complexity (in a model including bit-wise independent tampering). The
second construction is inspired by the recent works about non-malleable
codes of Agrawal et al. (TCC 2015) and of Cheraghchi and Guruswami
(TCC 2014) and improves our previous result in the bit-wise independent
tampering model: it builds the first non-malleable codes with linear-time
complexity and optimal-rate (i.e. rate 1 − o(1)).
Keywords: Non-malleable codes · Linear-time
Bit-wise independent tampering · Secret-sharing
1 Introduction
Non-malleable codes are a relaxation of error-correcting and error-detecting
codes that have useful applications in cryptography. For example, they can be
used to protect keys that are stored in non-robust devices against tampering
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attacks. Recently, they also found application to computational cryptography
(e.g. construction of non-malleable commitments [7,36] and domain extension
for public-key encryption schemes [20,21]). Roughly speaking, a coding scheme
(Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to the tampering function f if decod-
ing f(Enc(m)) produces the original message m or a value m ′ (possibly ⊥)
completely unrelated to m . Moreover, the probability of which one of these two
events happens is also independent of m . As an illustration of the notion, con-
sider a key that is stored in a device. The adversary is able to tamper with
the key and gets to see the effect of using the device with the tampered key
inside. If the key was coded with a non-malleable code and is decoded before
use, this attack becomes useless, as the key actually used after tampering is
either unchanged or is unrelated to the original key.
Since a tampering function can always try to decode, modify the message,
and encode again, it is clear that non-malleable codes are impossible without
restrictions on the tampering function. We therefore restrict the adversary to
using functions from a specific class F . In this case, we say that we have a
non-malleable code with respect to the family F . For example, if the encoding is
made by n symbols from a finite field F, then we can restrict the tampering func-
tion to be a function with n independent components (f1, . . . , fn) (symbol-wise
independent tampering, or bit-wise independent tampering if F = {0, 1}). Other
important features of the coding scheme are the rate and the computational
complexity1.
Non-malleable codes were introduced in 2010 by Dziembowski et al. [30].
Previously, Cramer et al. [24] introduced the notion of “Algebraic Manipulation
Detection” (AMD) codes. Such codes guarantee error-detection with respect to
the family of additive tampering functions. Since 2010, a line of works has estab-
lished increasingly stronger results concerning the feasibility of non-malleable
codes against different families of tampering functions. However, for many inter-
esting families the challenge of finding “good” non-malleable codes remains open.
In particular, we would like to have explicit constructions of non-malleable codes
with high rate and efficient encoding/decoding algorithm (i.e. low computational
complexity).
This paper follows this research direction studying the following natural ques-
tion: can we achieve the optimal properties of linear-time complexity and rate
approaching 1 simultaneously (via an explicit constriction)? This is not known,
even for the restricted case of bit-wise independent tampering, and even if we
only ask for linear-time complexity2.
Many of the known constructions of non-malleable codes (see for example
[7,8,15,17,30]) use linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS) as one of the main
1 The rate of the coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is the quotient of the length of the message
m over the length of its encoding Enc(m). The computational complexity of the
scheme is maximum of the computational complexities of the two algorithm Enc and
Dec in function of the length of m .
2 Determining which cryptographic primitives can be instantiated in linear-time is an
interesting and challenging program started by Ishai et al. in [37].
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building blocks. This holds also for the constructions presented in this paper.
Roughly speaking, a secret-sharing scheme is a randomised algorithm that
encodes a message m as a longer vector s such that m can be computed from
large enough sets of entries in s, while smaller set give no information about
m . LSSS with extra properties (uniformity and distance) are used already by
Dziembowski et al. in [30] where they introduce and motivate the formal notion
of non-malleable codes and also construct the first family of non-malleable codes
in the bit-wise independent tampering model. The computational complexity of
the code is quadratic in the size of the input length. Secondly, via the probabilis-
tic method they show that for any family F of tampering functions such that
|F| ≤ 22αn for some constant α < 1 (n is the length of the encoding) there exist
constant-rate non-malleable codes with respect to F . In this case, the description
of the code is of exponential size, thus the encoding and decoding algorithms
are inefficient. More recently, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [14,16] prove that for
this kind of families the optimal rate is 1 − α; they construct non-malleable
codes approaching this rate. Again, the construction is non-explicit and gives
rise to inefficient codes. For families of single exponential size, i.e. |F| ≤ 2p(n)
for some polynomial p, efficient (i.e. polynomial time) non-malleable codes were
constructed in [33]. This construction is also randomized, i.e. the construction
succeeds with overwhelming probability in providing non-malleable codes achiev-
ing optimal rate 1 − o(1). On the other hand, in [15] an explicit (deterministic)
construction of non-malleable codes with rate arbitrarily close to 1 in the bit-wise
independent tampering model is given. The construction is based on the concate-
nation of a linear error-correcting secret-sharing scheme of rate close to 1 and a
constant-size non-malleable code. This construction is instantiated using Reed-
Solomon codes and has thus computational complexity at least O(npolylog(n))
(super-linear).
In [38], Jafargholi and Wichs introduce tamper-detection codes (TD) and use
them together with leakage-resilient codes [27] to construct non-malleable codes
that achieve optimal rate when |F| ≤ 22αn and efficient encoding and decoding
when |F| ≤ 2p(n).
Our Contribution. In this paper, we study the above question and achieve pos-
itive results. In the first part of our work, we push forward the idea of using
linear secret sharing, and show that when the family of tampering functions has
a clear structure (as in the symbol-wise independent tampering model), then
simple constructions based on LSSS can achieve good results: we get constant-
rate non-malleable codes with optimal computational complexity O(k), where
k is the length of the input message. To obtain this, we also use known results
about linear-time encodable error-correcting codes and linear-time computable
universal hash functions [28,37].
Building on the first result, we then achieve both linear-time complexity
and optimal rate, that is rate 1 − o(1), for non-malleable codes in the bit-wise
independent tampering model. It is instructive to observe that optimal-rate non-
malleable codes with superlinear time complexity were constructed in [8,15],
4 R. Cramer et al.
and that these codes are based on secret sharing schemes with (relatively) large
privacy and reconstruction thresholds. The problem we face is that there are
no constructions of linear secret sharing schemes with linear-time complexity
for the required parameter range3. We therefore propose a novel construction
which is based on slightly weaker primitives which can be instantiated for the
rate 1 − o(1) and linear-time complexity regime.
Overview of our Constructions. As mentioned, we present two deterministic con-
structions for linear-time non-malleable codes: Construction 1 can be seen as
a generalization of the original construction of [30] and gives rise to the first
linear-time non-malleable codes with constant rate in the symbol-wise indepen-
dent tampering model. More generally, we prove that given a family of TD codes
with any computational complexity and rate, it is possible to explicitly construct
a family of non-malleable codes with constant rate and linear-time complexity.
The other ingredients of this first construction are constant-rate AMD codes and
constant-rate LSSS with good privacy (but where one needs almost all shares
to reconstruct). We present linear-time instantiations of both these primitives
using the results of [28]. Construction 1 encodes a message m with three sequen-
tial steps: first m is encoded with an AMD code, then the result is shared by a
LSSS with privacy and finally each share is encoded by a tamper-detection code
(see Fig. 1).
F
k AMD−−−−−→ FΘ(k) LSSS−−−−−→ (F )m componet-wise TD−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (F )m
m −−−−−→ m −−−−−→ s
(s1, . . . , sm) (c1, . . . , cm)
Fig. 1. The encoding algorithm of Construction 1 (m = Θ(k) and  constant).
In particular, in Construction 1 if the tamper-detection code is secure against
the family of tampering functions F with constant error, then the resulting
code is non-malleable with respect to the family F+ of functions of the form
(f1, . . . , fm) where each fi is a function from F , a constant function or the
identity and it has error negligible in the length of the input. Hence, depending
on how one instantiates the components of the construction, one can handle
more general tampering models than bit-wise4. A key point for the efficiency is
that the shares produced by the LSSS used are of constant size. This implies that
applying the tamper-detection code to all the shares results only in a constant
overhead for the computational complexity.
3 A Monte-Carlo construction by Cramer et al. [22] can be instantiated for a parameter
range where the rate of the secret sharing scheme is bounded away from 1 by a
constant, but not for rate approaching 1.
4 The concrete instantiation we give in Corollary 3 leads to bit-wise independent
tampering.
Linear-Time NM Codes Respect to Bit-Wise Independent Tampering 5
With Construction 2, we achieve linear-time non-malleable codes with opti-
mal rate approaching 1, still with an explicit (deterministic) construction. The
most efficient constructions of optimal rate non-malleable codes in the bit-wise
independent tampering model are from [8,15]. Both these constructions require
a secret sharing scheme with good privacy and non-trivial reconstruction thresh-
old. Together with the rate close to 1 constraint, these are challenging features to
achieve in linear-time. In our construction, we also use a secret-sharing scheme
with rate close to 1, but we do not require any reconstruction property for this
scheme. Instead, we combine the sharing scheme with two other tailored primi-
tives, each implementable in linear-time, and a short constant-rate non-malleable
code. The modular design of our construction makes the security proof much sim-
pler and more intuitive than previous constructions: each primitive takes care
of a specific property needed to prove non-malleability. The encoding is done
in the following way: first the input message is shared with a sharing scheme
that has rate 1 − o(1) and t-uniformity (that is, if s is the share vector of m ,
then each set of t components of s are distributed uniformly on Ft). Then we
use the two tailored primitives: first, a keyed almost universal function is used
to compute the first hash of s, hk (s). Second, we compute short deterministic
hash Comp(s), using a new primitive that we call a compressor. This compressed
value Comp(s) comes with the guaranty of having high entropy. The two hash
values and the key for the almost universal hash function can be thought of as
an “authentication tag” of m . The final encoding is given by the share vector
s and a non-malleable encoding of this tag, this encoding does not have to be
high-rate nor linear-time (see Fig. 2).
F
k sharing−−−−−→ Fk+o(k) hashing−−−−−−→ Fk+o(k) × Fo(k) × Fo(k) short NM−−−−−−−→ Fk+o(k) × Fo(k)
m −−−−−→ s −−−−−→ (s, hk(s),Comp(s))
(s,h, c) (s,NM(k,h, c))
Fig. 2. The encoding algorithm of Construction 2.
More related work. Bit-wise independent tampering functions act on each bit
of the encoding independently. In the more general, C-split state model the
encoding is partitioned into C blocks (C is a constant) and each block can
be tampered arbitrarily but independently of the others blocks (e.g. [18]). For
C = 10, an efficient and explicit construction of constant rate non-malleable
codes was given in [13]. Several results can be found in the literature when C = 2
(split-state model) [3–5,15,29,32,40,41]. In [41] the non-malleability property is
guaranteed only against computationally bounded adversaries, while the scheme
proposed by [29] is secure in the information-theoretic setting, but it can encode
only 1-bit messages. The first explicit construction of non-malleable codes with
information-theoretic security and message space larger than {0, 1} in the split-
state model was proposed in [4] and have rate polynomially small (k-bit strings
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are encoded into codewords of length ≈ k7). This result was recently improved
in [2], where the codeword length is decreased to O(k5). In 2015, Aggarwal
et al. [3] constructed the first explicit non-malleable codes in the split state
model achieving constant-rate. Rate approaching to 1 is achieved in [1,39] in the
computational setting.
In [7,8], Agrawal et al. construct explicit and non-malleable codes which
are simultaneously resilient against bit-wise independent tampering and per-
mutations. [7] gets optimal rate, but has super-linear computational complex-
ity. In [9] constant-rate and explicit non-malleable codes with respect to the
family of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that any output bit depends
only on nδ input bits (0 ≤ δ < 1 constant). Finally, notice that many variants
of non-malleable codes have been introduced in the literature: e.g. continuous
non-malleable codes [6,12,32,38], leakage-resilient non-malleable codes [5,31,41],
block-wise non-malleable codes [10,35] and local non-malleable codes [11,25,26].
Structure of the paper: In Sect. 2, we fix the notation and give the basic definitions
we need further on in the paper. In Sect. 3 first we give linear-time construction
for AMD codes and LSSS with privacy, then we present Construction 1 in general
and finally, we instantiate it for the binary case (bit-wise independent tampering
model). Section 4 is also divided in two parts: in the first one we define and
instantiate the primitives that are necessary for Construction 2; the latter is
described in the second part of the section together with its instantiation in the
bit-wise independent tampering model.
2 Preliminaries
For an integer n, we write [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and, given A ⊆ [n], |A| denotes
the cardinality of A, while Ac indicates the complement set of A, i.e. Ac =
[n] \ A. With the notation (z 1, . . . , zn) we indicate an element of the n-times
cartesian product of F, where F is a finite field of cardinality q and  is a positive
integer. Given z = (z 1, . . . , zn) ∈ (F)n and a subset A ⊆ [n], we will use zA
to denote the vector (z i)i∈A ∈ (F)|A|. Given two vectors z = (z 1, . . . , zn), v =
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (F)n, the generalized Hamming Distance between z and v is
defined by dHam(z , v) = |{i ∈ [n] | z i = v i}|. If Alg is an algorithm (randomized
or not) that takes as input a value from Fn, then the computational complexity
of Alg is the number of field elementary operations that Alg executes to compute
the output. We indicate with id the identity function. We say that a function ε is
negligible in n (ε(n) = negl(n)) if for every polynomial p there exists a constant
c such that ε(n) < 1p(n) when n > c. For a random variable X, the notation
v ← X denotes that v is sampled randomly according to X. For a set S, v ← S
denotes that v is sampled uniformly at random from S. Given two random
variables X and Y with finite range S, the statistical distance between X and Y
is defined as SD(X,Y ) = 12
∑
i∈S |Pr[X = i]−Pr[Y = i]|. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
be a random variable with range Sn and t be a positive integer less or equal
to n. We say that X is t-wise independent if for any A = {i1, . . . , it} subset
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of [n] of cardinality t and for any vector b = (b1, . . . , bt) ∈ St, it holds that
Pr[XA = b] =
∏t
j=1 Pr[Xij = bj ]. We say that X is t-wise uniform on S
n if for
any A ⊆ [n] of cardinality t, XA has the uniform distribution on St. If t = n we
simply say that X is an uniform random variable on Sn.
2.1 Tamper-Detection and Non-Malleability
Let F be a finite field and n, , k be positive integers. An -folded n-code over
F is a non-empty subset C of (F)n; we will refer to n as the length of the code.
Given a set A ⊆ [n], with the notation CA we indicate the set {cA | c ∈ C}. If
ψ : C → Fk is a regular function, the pair (C, ψ) is called -folded (n, k)-coding
scheme. The rate of a scheme is the ratio k/n. If F = {0, 1}, the scheme is
called binary. When  = 1, we simply call it (n, k)-coding scheme. If C is a vector
space over F, then the code is called linear. The dimension of a linear code is its
dimension as vector space over F. Moreover, if the map ψ is an F-linear map,
also the scheme (C, ψ) is called linear.
Remark 1. Given an -folded (n, k)-coding scheme (C, ψ), any randomized algo-
rithm Enc : Fk → C that on input m ∈ Fk outputs c ∈ ψ−1({m}) selected uni-
formly at random is called encoding algorithm. On the other side, decoding algo-
rithm is the name used for the deterministic algorithm Dec : (F)n → Fk ∪ {⊥}
that maps c to m = ψ(c) ∈ Fk if c ∈ C and to ⊥ otherwise. For convenience5,
in the following we will always identify a coding scheme (C, ψ) with the pair
(Enc,Dec).
While keeping F fixed, we will assume throughout that n = n(k). The com-
putational complexity (as a function of k) of a coding scheme is the maximum
taken over the computational complexities of Enc and Dec, respectively. We say
that a coding scheme is linear-time if both Enc and Dec have complexity O(k).
Let (Enc,Dec) be an -folded (n, k)-coding scheme over F. Given an encoding
c ← Enc(m) for the message m ∈ Fk, tampering with c can be represented
by considering a function f : (F)n → (F)n that modifies the encoding c in
c˜ = f(c). The output of Dec(c˜) now depends on the original message m and
also on the tampering function f . To represent this, we consider the following





sample c ← Enc(m);
compute c˜ = f(c);
output m˜ = Dec(c˜);
A simple but strong property that we can ask for is that the coding scheme is
able to detect with overwhelming probability the tampering caused by all the
functions f from a specific family F .
5 The two definitions are equivalent. Given the pair (Enc,Dec) such that for any m it
holds Pr[Dec(Enc(m)) = m ] = 1, define C as the image of Enc in (F)n and ψ as the
map Dec restricted to C.
8 R. Cramer et al.
Definition 1 (TD Code, [38]). Given a family F of functions over (F)n, an
-folded (n, k)-tamper detection code with respect to F and with error  is an
(n, k)-coding scheme such that Pr[Realmf =⊥] ≤ , ∀m ∈ Fk and ∀ f ∈ F .
For example, any error-correcting code from coding theory with minimal distance
d is a TD code with respect to the family Fdist of functions that modify less
than d components in the input vector (i.e. dHam(f(x ),x ) < d). The name
algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code, introduced by [24], is used for
TD codes with respect to the family Famd of additive tampering functions. That
is, functions of the form fe(x ) = x +e where the vector e is a non-zero constant
vector independent of x .
Unfortunately, tampering detection can not be achieved for many natural
families. For example, consider the family Fconst of all constant functions
fc(x ) = c for c ∈ (F)n; if c is a valid encoding, then Pr[Realmfc =⊥] = 1 for all
m ∈ Fk. In order to be able to consider larger families of tampering functions, the
definition of tampering detection needs to be relaxed. Instead of asking that the
tampering is detected, we can ask that the result of the tampering action is inde-
pendent of the original message. This property, called non-malleability is weaker
than tampering-detection, nevertheless it offers enough protection against tam-
pering attacks: an adversary that actively modifies encoded data can not control
the practical effect of his action on the encoded message.
Definition 2 (NM Code, [30]). An -folded (n, k)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec)
is said to be non-malleable with respect to a family F with error  if the following






sample m∗ ← Df ;
if m∗ = same then m′ = m;
otherwise m′ = m∗;
output m′;
then SD(Realmf , Ideal
m
f ) ≤  for any m ∈ Fk.
In the rest of the paper we will mainly consider the family of symbol-
wise independent tampering functions. That is, if the encoding has the form
c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ (F)n, then each component ci can be modified arbi-
trarily but independently of the values of the others components. We will
use the following notation: F q,n = {f = (f1, . . . , fn) | fi : F → F} and
f(c) = (f1(c1), . . . , fn(cn)). Let q be the cardinality of the field F, note that
if q = 2 and  = 1, F 21,n is the family considered in the bit-wise independent
tampering model.
2.2 Secret-Sharing
Suppose that (Enc,Dec) is an -folded (n, k)-coding scheme over F. Let t, r be
positive integers.
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Definition 3. (Enc,Dec) has t-privacy if the following holds for each set
A ⊂ [n] of F-coordinates with |A| = t. For each m,m′ ∈ Fk, the distrib-
utions of (Enc(m))A and (Enc(m′))A on (F)t are identical. The scheme has
t-uniformity if these distributions are the uniform ones on (F)t. (Enc,Dec) has
r-reconstruction if the following holds for each set A ⊂ [n] of F-coordinates with
|A| = r. If c, c′ ∈ C satisfy cA = c′A, then Dec(c) = Dec(c′).
Note that any scheme has n-reconstruction. Moreover, if the coding scheme has
r-reconstruction and t-privacy, then t < r.
Remark 2. Given an -folded linear (n, k)-coding scheme, it is easy to prove
that t-privacy and t-uniformity are equivalent to the following conditions,
respectively.
– (t-privacy) for each set A ⊆ [n] of F-coordinates with |A| = t, the map that
maps c in C to the pair (Dec(c), cA) is surjective;
– (t-uniformity) the same condition as before holds and moreover CA = (F)t.
Definition 4 (LSSS). An -folded (n, t, r, k)-secret-sharing scheme over F
(with uniformity) is an -folded (n, k)-coding scheme over F with t-privacy (t-
uniformity) and r-reconstruction. If the coding scheme is linear then we call it
linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS).
Notice that in the existing literature, the algorithms Enc and Dec of a secret-
sharing scheme are often indicated with the notation Sh (sharing algorithm) and
Rec (reconstruction algorithm), respectively. Moreover, if c ← Sh(m), then c is
called share vector. Later on in the paper we will use this notation.
In this work, we will use secret-sharing schemes with different parameters and
properties as building blocks for constructing efficient NM codes. In particular,
for Construction 1 we are interested in the following aspect: what happens if the
reconstruction algorithm of a t-private LSSS is applied to a share vector where
at most t components have been tampered arbitrarily but independently from
the others. The answer is stated in the next lemma (proof in [23]).
Lemma 1. Let (Sh,Rec) be a t-private -folded (n, k)-LSSS. Fix a set A ⊆ [n] of
F
-coordinates with |A| ≤ t and an (eventually randomized) function g : (F)n →
(F)n with the following properties. For any s ∈ (F)n, (g(s))Ac = sAc and
(g(s))A depends only on the entries of sA. Then, there exists a random variable
Δg on (F)n ∪ {⊥} such that for any m ∈ Fk, Rec(g(Sh(m))) has the same
distribution of m + Δg (with the convention that m+ ⊥=⊥).
3 Constant-Rate and Linear-Time NM Codes
In this section, we describe our first main result: Construction 1 (Fig. 4) combines
an AMD code, a LSSS and a TD code with constant error in order to construct a
constant-rate NM code (with negligible error) whose computational complexity
is controlled by the complexity of the two first schemes used (the AMD code
and the LSSS).
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3.1 Building Blocks for Construction 1
Before describing Construction 1, we build linear-time and constant-rate AMD
codes and LSSSs.
We recall that a coding scheme (Enc,Dec) (with alphabet F) is an (n, k)-
AMD code6 with error  if ∀m ∈ Fk and any non-zero e ∈ Fn, it holds that
Pr[Dec(Enc(m) + e) =⊥] ≤ . This special family of TD codes are of particular
interest because, despite their simple definition, they can be used as basic tools of
generic constructions for coding scheme that achieve security against tampering
family larger than Famd (see for example [30] and our Construction 1). Clearly,
the parameters (i.e. the rate) and the efficiency of the final schemes depend on
the ones of the AMD codes used. In particular, in order to prove our result about
constant-rate and linear-time NM codes (Theorem 2), we need to build constant-
rate and linear-time AMD codes. Our construction, presented in the following
Corollary 1, is based on the family of linear uniform functions from [28].
Lemma 2 (Linear Uniform Family, Theorem 4 in [28]). For any positive
integer c there exists a positive constant b (b ≥ c) such that for any large enough
k there is family of functions {gk : Fk → Fck}k with k ∈ Fbk, such that the
following holds:
1. gk has computational complexity O(k);
2. gk is F-linear and gk1+k2 = gk1 + gk2 ;
3. for any y ∈ Fck and x ∈ Fk with x = 0, if k is chosen uniformly at random
from Fbk then Pr[gk(x) = y] = 1qck .
Corollary 1 (Linear-Time and Constant-Rate AMD code). For any
large enough integer k, there exists a linear-time (k′, k)-AMD code with error
q−k and k′ = Θ(k).
Proof (Sketch). Given k, let G be the family from Lemma 2 with c = 1. For the
sake of simplicity we assume that b = 1 and we define:
Encamd(m) = (m , k , r , gk (m), gk (r), gr (k)), where k , r ∈ Fk are chosen uni-
formly at random and
Decamd(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6) =
{
v1 if gv2(v1) = v4, gv2(v3) = v5, gv3(v2) = v6
⊥ otherwise
It is easy to verify that (Encamd,Decamd) is a (6k, k)-AMD code with error 1qk
and computational complexity O(k). The details of this proof together with its
generalization to the case b > 1 can be found in [23]. unionsq
6 For Construction 1 we need a “strong” AMD code (as in [30]), while AMD codes
were introduced in [24] by a slightly different (weaker) notion (∀m and ∀ e,
Pr[Dec(Enc(m) + e) /∈ {⊥,m}] ≤ ).
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For Construction 1, we are interested in linear-time (m, t,m, k)-LSSS with
large privacy (i.e. t > m/2) and constant-rate. Recently [22], the first linear-time
constant-rate LSSS was shown, using a construction based on a combination of
suitable linear codes and universal hash functions. More concretely, while being
linear over a fixed finite field and supporting an unbounded number of players
(or shares) m, there are constants s, t, r with 0 < s, t, r < 1 and an integer
 (the share size) such that the length k of the secret satisfies k ≥ esm, the
privacy parameter t satisfies t ≥ tm and the reconstruction parameter r satisfies
r ≤ rm. Moreover, both the sharing and the reconstruction algorithm have
complexity linear in m. Although here we also need constant-rate linear-time
sharing scheme, we do not use the result from for Construction 1 and instead we
construct our constant-rate linear-time sharing scheme for two reasons. First,
the construction in [22] is a Monte-Carlo construction, while in this work we
are interested only in explicit (deterministic) constructions. Second, later on
(Sect. 4) we will require constant-rate sharing scheme with t-uniformity (instead
of only t-privacy). Our schemes from Corollary 2 have this extra property that
is not satisfied by the schemes presented in [22].
We construct the required LSSS using linear codes. Let D be an -folded
linear m-code of dimension k over the finite field F. The minimum distance of D
is defined as d = min{dHam(c, c′) | c, c′ ∈ D, c = c′}. If G is a k×m matrix over
F
, we say that G is a generator matrix for the code D if D = {m ·G | m ∈ Fk}.
We say the D is a linear-time encodable code if the map m → m · G can be
computed by an algorithm that has computational complexity O(k).
The following Lemma generalizes and rephrases Theorem 2 in [19] asserting
that LSSS with t-uniformity can be obtained from linear codes with distance
t + 1.
Lemma 3. Let G be the generator matrix of an -folded linear code of length
m, dimension k and minimum distance d. Assume that G = (Ik,M) where Ik
is the k × k identity matrix (systematic form of the code)7. Then the scheme
define in Fig. 3 is an -folded (m, d − 1,m, k)-LSSS with uniformity. If the code
is linear-time encodable, then the LSSS obtained has linear-time complexity.
Proof. According to Remark 2, showing that the map ψA : c → (c · G, cA) is
surjective over Fk × (F)d−1 for any A ⊆ [m] of size d−1 is enough to prove that
(Sh1,Rec1) (see Fig. 3) has d− 1 uniformity. Clearly G (and then G) has rank
k (over F) and the map c → c · G is surjective. Moreover since G generates a
code of distance d, we can remove any d − 1 columns of G (i.e. d − 1 rows from
G) and the punctured matrix still has rank k (as any two distinct codewords
differ in at least d coordinates). This means that for any m we can solve in
x the linear system x · G = m even when d − 1 components of x are fixed.
This trivially implies that also the map ψA is surjective and concludes the proof
of the uniformity property. Finally, it follows directly from Tellegen’s principle
7 With (I k,M ) we indicate that we append the columns of M to the ones of the
identity matrix I k.
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Input: m ∈ Fk
Sh1(m):
Sample x ← (F )m−k
Compute x =m− x ·M
Output x = (x ,x )
Input: c ∈ (F )m
Rec1(c):
Compute m = c ·G
Output m
Fig. 3. Linear-time and constant-rate LSSS
(see Appendix A.1) that if the underlying code is linear-time encodable, then
both the algorithms Sh1 and Rec1 are linear-time. unionsq
Instantiating Lemma 3 with ad-hoc linear-time encodable codes (derived by
the linear-time encodable codes of [28]) provides us with LSSS with the required
properties.
Lemma 4 (Linear-Time Codes, Theorem 2 in [28]). For any real number
δ ∈ (0, 1) and large enough integer k, there exist a real number ρ ∈ (0, 1), a
positive integer  and a linear code over F such that the following hold. The code
is -folded; if m is the length of the code and d is its minimum distance, then
k
 < m ≤ kρ and d ≥ δm. Furthermore, the code is linear-time encodable.
Corollary 2 (Linear-Time and Constant-Rate LSSS). For any real num-
ber δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a positive integer  such that for any large enough k
there exists an (m, k)-coding scheme over F with the following properties. The
scheme is an -folded linear-time LSSS with δm-uniformity and m = Θ(k).
Proof. Given δ and k, let M be the generator matrix of the code of Lemma 4,
then the matrix G = (I k,M ) defines a -folded linear code of dimension k,
length m+k and distance at least δm+1. The Corollary follows from Lemma 3. unionsq
3.2 Construction 1
Finally, we are ready to give the details of Construction 1 and its security proof.
All the schemes in the following are defined over the finite field F and are 1-folded
if it is not explicitly stated otherwise. Consider the following building blocks:
– Let (Encamd,Decamd) be a (k′, k)-AMD code with error ;
– Let (Sh1,Rec1) be an -folded (m, t,m, k′)-LSSS with privacy;
– Finally let (Enctd,Dectd) be an (′, )-TD codes with respect to the family F
and with error α.
The new coding scheme (ENC1,DEC1) is defined in Fig. 4. We indicate with F+
the set of tampering functions f : (F
′
)m → (F′)m in F q′,m such each fi is a
function from F∪Fconst∪{id}. That is, each block ci of the encoding is modified
by the adversary using a function fi : F
′ → F′ , which can be any function from
F ∪ Fconst ∪ {id} provided that it doesn’t depend on the others blocks of the
encoding.
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Input: m ∈ Fk
ENC1(m)
Sample s ← Sh1(Encamd(m))
Parse s = (s1, . . . sm)
For i = 1, . . .m:
ci ← Enctd(si)
Output c = (c1, . . . , cm)
Input: c ∈ (F )m
DEC1(c)
Parse c = (c1, . . . cm)
For i = 1, . . . ,m
si = Dectd(ci)
If si =⊥ output ⊥
Define s = (s1, . . . , sm)
Compute m = Decamd(Rec1(s))
Output m
Fig. 4. Construction 1
Theorem 1. If t > m2 , then (ENC1,DEC1) defined in Fig. 4 is an 
′-folded
(m, k)-NM code with respect to the family F+ with error less than or equal to
max{, α2t−m}. Moreover, if ρ is the rate of (Encamd,Decamd) and ρ′ is the rate
of the sharing scheme, then the rate k/m′ of the new scheme is ρρ′ ′ .
Proof. The correctness of the scheme (ENC1,DEC1) (i.e. Pr[DEC1(ENC1(m)) =
m ] = 1 for any m ∈ Fk) and the statement about the rate are easy to verify and
follow directly from the construction (Fig. 4). Fix f = (f1, f2, . . . , fm) ∈ F+,
to prove the non-malleability property, we have to define Df as in Definition 2
and bound the error SD(Realmf , Ideal
m
f ) for any m ∈ Fk. Let c = (c1, . . . , cm) =
ENC1(m) and s = (s1, . . . , sm) = Sh1(Encamd(m)). Notice that a valid encoding
in the new scheme is a vector c = (c1, . . . , cm) of m blocks each of which
is an encoding done by the constant-size tamper-detection code (Enctd,Dectd).
Each block is independently tampered by the function fi : F
′ → F′ and since
(Enctd,Dectd) is an TD code, for any block such that fi ∈ F we know that the
outputs of Dectd(fi(ci)) is ⊥ with probability greater or equal to 1 − α. Using
this and the t-privacy property, in the following we will show that we can have
enough information on the output of DEC1(f(ENC1(m))) only looking at how
many blocks have been tampered by functions not in F . More precisely, define
the following sets: I ⊆ [m] is the set of indices i such that fi is the identity
function, C ⊆ [m] is the set of indices i such that fi is a constant function on
F
′ and J = [m] \ (I ∪ C) = (I ∪ C)c. Consider now the following cases:
(1) Suppose that many blocks are tampered using constant functions (i.e. |C| ≥
m − t). Then, the t-privacy implies that the distribution of the blocks not
touched by a constant function is the same for any input message m , while
all the other blocks are fixed to known constants. Hence, we define Df as
– sample d accordingly to the distribution of ENC1(0 ) and output the result
of DEC1(f(d)).
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Because of the t-privacy, DEC1(f(d)) has the same distribution of
DEC1(f(c)) and thus we have that SD(Realmf , Ideal
m
f ) = 0.
(2) Otherwise we can assume that few blocks are tampered by constant func-
tions (i.e. |J | + |I| > t) and we consider two sub-cases.
(2.a) Suppose that few blocks are tampered (i.e. |I| ≥ m − t) and look at
what happens during the execution of DEC1 on input f(c). If there
exists i ∈ Ic such that Dectd(fi(ci)) =⊥, then the entire decoding out-
puts ⊥. Otherwise, we have the situation described by Lemma 1 with8
g = Dectd ◦f ◦Enctd. Indeed, in the decoding phase the algorithm Rec1
is applied to a share vector s˜ where at most t components have been
modified respect to the original share vector s. It follows by Lemma 1
that Rec1(s˜) has the same distribution as Encamd(m) +Δg. Moreover,
by definition of AMD code, if Δg = 0 , then DEC1(f(c)) outputs the
original message m , else it outputs ⊥ with probability grater than or
equal to 1 − . Thus, in this case we define Df by the following steps:
– sample r = (r1, . . . , rm) accordingly to the distribution of Sh1(0 ). If
there exists i ∈ Ic such that Dectd(fi(Enctd(r i))) =⊥, then output ⊥.
Otherwise continue with the next step;
– sample e accordingly to the distribution of Δg. If e = 0 , Df outputs
same; otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Because of the t-privacy, the probability that there exists i ∈ Ic such
that Dectd(fi(ci)) =⊥ is equal to the probability that there exists
i ∈ Ic such that Dectd(fi(Enctd(r i))) =⊥. Moreover, Lemma 1 implies
that SD(Realmf , Ideal
m
f ) = Pr[Decamd(Encamd(m) + Δg)) =⊥] and we
know the latter to be less than or equal to .
(2.b) Else we can use the assumption on t and m and say that more than
2t−m blocks are tampered by functions in F . That is, |J | > t−m+t =
2t − m > 0. Independently for all these blocks, the tamper-detection
code outputs a message different from ⊥ with probability less than or
equal to α. Thus, DEC1(f(c)) =⊥ with probability less than or equal
to α2t−m. Therefore, in this last case we define Df to output ⊥ and we
have that SD(Realmf , Ideal
m
f ) = Pr[Real
m
f =⊥] ≤ Pr[Dectd(fi(ci)) =⊥
∀ i ∈ J ] ≤ α2t−m. unionsq
We are now ready to state the first of the results about linear-time NM codes
that we present in this paper:
Theorem 2 (Linear-Time and Constant-Rate NM codes). If for infi-
nitely many integers b, there exists an (b′, b)-TD code with respect of a family F
and with constant error α, then there exist a positive integer ′ such that the fol-
lowing holds. For any large enough integer k there exists an ′-folded (m, k)-NM
code (ENC1,DEC1) with respect of the family F+ and m = Θ(k). Furthermore,
the NM code has error negligible in k and linear-time computational complexity.
8 Abuse of notation, with g = Dectd ◦ f ◦ Enctd we mean the randomized function
g : (F)m → (F)m such that (g(v))i = Dectd(fi(Enctd(v i))) for all i ∈ [m].
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Proof. Instantiate Construction 1 with the AMD code given by Corollary 1 and
with the LSSS given by Corollary 2. More details in [23].
In [15] an infinite family of TD code with respect the family F of bit-wise
independent tampering functions that are neither the identity nor constant func-
tions is given. Each code in the family has an error less than or equal to 2/3.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 3.5 in [15]).9 For any β ∈ (0, 1) and any large enough ′
(i.e. ′ ≥ ′(β) = O(log2(1/β)/β)), there exists a binary (, ′)-TD code respect
to the family F = F 21,n \ (Fconst ∪ {id}) with error 2/3 and with  ≥ (1 − β)′.
The previous lemma together with Theorem 2 implies the following result in
bit-wise independent tampering model.
Corollary 3 (Binary Case for Construction 1). For any large enough
integer k, there exists a linear-time binary (N, k)-NM code with respect of the
family F 21,N and with error negligible in k. Furthermore N = Θ(k).
4 Optimal-Rate and Linear-Time NM Codes
In this section, we will construct a linear-time non-malleable code with rate
approaching 1 (Construction 2).
4.1 Building Blocks for Construction 2
Before showing our second main result (Construction 2), we present the required
building blocks.
In order to achieve linear-time and optimal-rate NM codes, we will
employ linear-time (n, t, n, k)-secret-sharing schemes again, however we will need
stronger assumptions regarding the rate and the privacy property of the used
scheme. Namely, besides linear-time complexity, we require that the rate is not
merely constant but that it approaching 1, i.e., length of a full share-vector
divided by the length of the secret tends to 1 when the n tends to infinity. By
general bounds on secret sharing, this implies that the privacy parameter t is
sublinear in the number of players n and that reconstruction is essentially by
the full player set only. But that is still fine for our purposes here (as long as
privacy is nonconstant). Moreover, we note that we do not require linearity of
the scheme either. Besides, we require that any t shares are uniformly and inde-
pendently distributed over the share-space (t-uniformity). Below we show how to
construct the schemes required here by combining results on t-wise independence
generators and constant-rate secret sharing. A t-wise independence generator is
a deterministic algorithm that expands a short random seed in a longer t-uniform
vector. More precisely:
9 The construction presented in [15] is randomised, but since in our Construction 1
the parameter  is constant (respect to k) we can exhaustively search for the proper
TD code.
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Definition 5 (t-wise Independence Generator, [34]). Let k, k′ and t be
positive integers. A function Gen : Fk
′ → Fk is a t-wise independence generator
if the following holds. For each uniform random variable X over Fk
′
(called the
seed), Gen(X) is t-wise uniform over Fk.
In [23] (Lemma 12) we provide an independence generator with seed-length
and independence sub-linear in the output length. Moreover the proposed inde-
pendence generator has computational complexity linear in the seed-length.
Lemma 6 shows how to use the t-wise independence generator to build a linear-
time secret-sharing scheme with t′-uniformity, t′ = Θ(t) and rate 1 − o(1). The
high-level idea (Fig. 5) is simple, to share a secret m ∈ Fk we do the following.
First, we mask m using Gen(s) where s is a uniformly random seed for Gen.
Then, we share the seed s with a constant-rate sharing scheme (for example, the
scheme from Corollary 2). The final share vector is defined by the concatenation
of m + Gen(s) and the share vector of s.
Sh2(m):
Sample s ← Fk
Compute c1 =m+ Gen(s)
Compute c2 ← Sh1(s)
Output c = (c1, c2)
Rec2(c):
Parse c = (c1, c2)
Compute s = Rec1(c2)
If s = ⊥, then output ⊥
Otherwise output c1 Gen(s)
Fig. 5. Linear-time and optimal-rate LSSS
Lemma 6 (Linear-Time and Optimal-Rate LSSS). For any real number
 ∈ (0, 1) and any large enough k, there exists a linear-time (n, t, n, k)-LSSS with
uniformity such that t = Ω(k1−) and n = k + o(k).
Proof. Given  ∈ (0, 1) and k large enough, there exists a t-wise independence
generator Gen : Fk
′ → Fk with t = Ω(k1−) and k′ = Θ(k1−δ) (δ ≤ , see
Lemma 12 in [23]). Let (Sh1,Rec1) be the (m, t′,m, k′)-LSSS from Corollary 2.
Notice10 that m = Θ(k′) and that the scheme is t′-uniform with t′ = Θ(k′).
Consider the scheme in Fig. 5 and define s = min{t, t′}. It is easy to verify
that (Sh2,Rec2) is a linear-time (n, s, n, k)-LSSS with uniformity. Moreover, s =
Ω(k1−) and n = k + m = n + O(k1−δ). unionsq
We introduce a novel primitive, a compressor. Suppose we are given a vector
whose coordinates are t-wise independent random variables. A compressor is
a deterministic function that, when applying it to the given vector, results in
a shorter vector with nontrivial entropy11, assuming that the original vector
contains at least t coordinates with nontrivial entropy12.
10 The family of LSSSs from Corollary 2 is  folded, where  is a constant respect to k′.
Thus, the scheme (Sh1,Rec1) can be “unfolded” and still it remains a constant-rate
scheme.
11 The min-entropy of a random variable X is H∞(X) = − log2(maxb Pr[X = b]).
12 Since we require compressors to be deterministic, generic methods for privacy ampli-
fication do not apply here.
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Definition 6 (compressor). Let t, n, n′ be positive integers and r a positive
real number. A function Comp : Fn → Fn′ is a (t, r)-compressor if the following
holds. Suppose that X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is a t-wise independent random variable
on Fn such that there is a set A ⊆ [n] of cardinality t and a real number c > 0
for which H∞(Xi) ≥ c for all i ∈ A. Then H∞(Comp(X)) ≥ rc.
This primitive is used in the security proof of Construction 2 to handle the case of
a component-wise tampering function that has many non-constant components.
More precisely, we will use the following fact:
Lemma 7. Let f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ F q1,n be a function such that least t of the
of the functions fi : F → F are non-constant. If Comp : Fn → Fn′ is a (t, r)-
compressor and X is a t-wise uniform random variable on Fn, then for any






Proof. By the conditions on f , there is a set A ⊆ [n] of cardinality t such that,
for each i ∈ A it holds that H∞(fi(Xi)) ≥ log2(q/(q − 1)). Since X is t-wise
independent, it follows by definition of compressor that H∞(Comp(f(X))) ≥
r log2(q/(q − 1)). unionsq
We now show a simple construction of Comp suitable for our purposes later on.
Lemma 8 (Linear-Time Compressor). For any real number  ∈ (0, 1) and
for any large enough positive integer n there exists an (r2, r)-compressor Comp :
F
n → Fn′ with r2 = Ω(n1−) and n′ = o(n). Moreover Comp has computational
complexity O(n).
Proof. Given , for any n ≥ 1 define r = n(1−)/2 and n′ = n/r. Notice that
n′r ≤ n and, if n large enough, r2 ≤ n. Consider the function Comp : Fn → Fn′ ,
(x 1, . . . ,xn) → (y1, . . . ,yn′) defined by y i =
∑r
j=1 x (i−1)r+j for i = 1, . . . , n
′.
Thus, a vector in the domain is viewed as comprising n′ consecutive blocks of
r coordinates and, for i = 1, . . . , n′, the sum taken over the coordinates in the
i-th block gives the i-th coordinate in the image of the vector under Comp. We
now verify that Comp is a (r2, r)-compressor. Suppose X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a
r2-wise independent random variable on Fn and suppose A ⊂ [n] with |A| = r2
satisfies H∞(Xi) ≥ c > 0 for each i ∈ A. Define (Y1, . . . , Yn′) = Comp(X). By the
pigeonhole principle, there exists a B ⊆ [n′] with |B| = r such that each Yi with
i ∈ B is sum of at least one Xi with i ∈ A. This, together with r2-independence
of X, implies that the corresponding random variable YB = (Yi)i∈B has the
properties that H∞(Yi) ≥ c for each i ∈ B and that the Yi’s are independent. In
conclusion, H∞(Comp(X)) ≥ H∞(YB) ≥ rc. By inspection, the computational
complexity of Comp is O(n). unionsq
Our Construction 2 that we present later on in Sect. 4.2 depends in particular
on universal hash functions.
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Definition 7 (Almost Universal Family). Let μ ∈ (0, 1) be a real number
and let n,m be positive integers. Suppose H is a family of functions hk : Fn →
F
m, one for each k ∈ Fa. Then H is μ-almost universal if the following holds.
For any pair of distinct x,x′ ∈ Fn, if k is chosen uniformly at random from Fa
then Pr[hk(x) = hk(x′)}] ≤ μ.
For our purposes, we require that these functions are linear-time computable
and have vanishingly small key- and output-lengths. Hence, the linear uniform
family of [28] (see Lemma 2) does not apply directly due to its linear key-length.
Note that, besides linear-time, the uniform output property of this particular
family enables arbitrary output-length. In [23] we show an easy adaptation of
the family from [28] suitable for our purposes. It is a μ-almost universal family.
But since μ is very small, it is good enough for our purposes.
Lemma 9. For any real number β ∈ (0, 1) and any positive integer n, there
exists a μ-universal family H = {hk : Fn → Fm}k∈Fa with a = o(n), m = o(n)
and μ = Θ(q−n
(1−β)
). Moreover, each function hk has complexity O(n).
4.2 Construction 2
Finally, we are ready to give the details of Construction 2 and its security proof.
Consider the following ingredients (all the scheme are over the finite field F):
– Let (Sh2,Rec2) an (n, t, n, k)-SSS with uniformity;
– Let Comp : Fn → Fn′ be a (t, r)-compressor;
– Let H = {hk : Fn → Fm} be a μ-almost universal family with key-space Fa;
– Let (Enc,Dec) be a (b′, b)-NM code with respect to a family F with error .
We require that b = a + m + n′.
Let N = n+ b′, the new (N, k)-coding scheme (ENC2,DEC2) is defined in Fig. 6.
Theorem 3. The coding scheme (ENC2,DEC2) is an (N, k)-non-malleable code













Proof. It is trivial to verify that the scheme (DEC2,ENC2) is correct, that
is Pr[DEC2(ENC2(m)) = m ] = 1 for all m ∈ Fk. In order to prove non-
malleability, for each tampering function F we have to show a simulator which
only depends on F and whose output distribution is statistically close to the
one of DEC2(F (ENC2(m))) for any given m ∈ Fk. More precisely, according to
Definition 2 for any F = (f, g) ∈ F q1,n × F , we have to define a random vari-
able DF and bound the error ′ = SD(RealmF , Ideal
m
F ) for any m ∈ Fk. Given
F and m ∈ Fk, we write ENC2(m) = (c(1), c(2)). Notice that the left part of
the encoding, c(1), is tampered by the function f ∈ F q1,n, while the right part,
c(2), by the function g from F . Since (Enc,Dec) is a NM-code, there exists the
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Input: m ∈ Fk
ENC2(m):
Compute c(1) ← Sh2(m)
Sample k ← Fa
Compute h = hk(c
(1))
Compute c = Comp(c(1))
Compute c(2) = Enc(k,h, c)
Output (c(1), c(2))
Input: c ∈ FN
DEC2(c):
Parse c = (c(1), c(2)) ∈ Fn × Fb
Compute z = Dec(c(2))
If z =⊥ output ⊥
Otherwise
Parse z = (k,h, c)
If h = hk(c
(1)) output ⊥
If c = Comp(c(1)) output ⊥
Output m = Rec2(c
(1))
Fig. 6. Construction 2
random variable Dg such that SD(Realzg , Ideal
z
g) ≤  for all z ∈ Fb. That is,
we can simulate the output of decoding the right part, Dec(g(c(2))), using the
random variable Idealzg . Specifically, we define the random variable Hyb
m
F as
detailed in Fig. 7. Notice that by construction the output of HybmF depends on
c(1) (the output of Sh2(m)) and on the output of Idealzg , and the output of Real
m
F
depends on c(1) and the output of Realzg in the same way. Thus, we have that
SD(RealmF ,Hyb
m
F ) ≤ SD(Realzg , Idealzg). Given this, defining the random variable
DF in such a way that we can bound ′′ = SD(HybmF , Ideal
m
F ) will conclude the
proof. Indeed, we have ′ ≤  + ′′. To define DF , first sample z ∗ randomly
according to Dg. The results of the sampling can be classified in three cases: ⊥,
same or some vector (k∗,h∗, c∗). Then, we proceed in the definition of DF in
a different way for each one of the three aforementioned cases. In each case, we
will bound the error ′′. In the following, we will write f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ F q1,n.
Remember that the value of z ∗ determines the output z ′ of Idealzg .
(1) Assume that z ∗ =⊥, then z ′ =⊥. We know that Pr[HybmF =⊥| Dg =⊥] = 1,
thus we define DF to output ⊥ and we get that ′′ = 0.
(2) If z ∗ = same, then z ′ = (k , hk (c(1)),Comp(c(1))). Define I ⊆ [n] the set of
indices i such that fi is the identity function on F. Consider the following
two situations.
• First, assume that many fi are the identity function (i.e. |I| ≥ n−t). Then
the difference f(c(1)) − c(1) depends only on the vector (c(1))Ic whose
entries are independent of m (because of the t-uniformity property). In
particular, both the event f(c(1)) = c(1) and its complement occur with
the same probability for any message m . If f(c(1)) = c(1), then HybmF
obviously outputs the original message m . Otherwise, we have f(c(1)) =
c(1) and the check done via the hash function hk fails with probability at
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least 1− μ. If the check fails, HybmF outputs ⊥. Given this, we define DF
in the following way:
– sample r i ← F for all i ∈ Ic; if fi(r i) = r i for all i ∈ Ic then outputs
same, otherwise output ⊥.
As we have already argued before, the t-uniformity property implies that
the event fi(r i) = r i for all i ∈ Ic has the same probability as the event
f(c(1)) = c(1) and therefore, as a consequence of the check involving the
hash function, we can bound the error in the following way:
′′ ≤ Pr[HybmF =⊥| Dg = same and f(c(1)) = c(1)]
≤ Pr[hk (f(c(1))) = hk (c(1)) | f(c(1)) = c(1)] ≤ μ
• In the second case, assume that many fi are not the identity function
(i.e. |I| < n − t). Then, there exists a set A ⊆ Ic of size t, and it follows
again from the uniformity property that the events fi(c
(1)
i ) = c(1)i with
i ∈ A are independent and each of them occurs with probability at least
1/q. Therefore, very likely and independently of m , f(c(1)) = c(1) and
HybmF outputs ⊥ because of the check done using the hash function hk .
For this reason, in this case we define DF to always output ⊥ and we can
bound the error as follows.
′′ ≤ Pr[HybmF =⊥| Dg = same] ≤ Pr[hk (f(c(1))) = hk (c(1))]






(3) If z ∗ = (k∗,h∗, c∗), then we have that z ′ = z ∗. Let C ⊆ [n] be the set of
all indices i such that fi is a constant function on F. Consider the following
two situations.
• If many fi are constant functions (i.e. |C| ≥ n − t), then the value of
vector f(c(1)) is independent of m . Indeed, the t-uniformity makes the
value of (f(c(1)))Cc independent of m , while (f(c(1)))C is fixed equal to
a constant defined only by f . It follows that, if we define DF in this way:
– sample r ← Fn, if h∗ = hk∗(f(r)) or c∗ = Comp(f(r)) output ⊥; other-
wise output Rec2(f(r)).
then we have that ′′ = 0.
• Otherwise more than t components fi are not constant functions (i.e.
|C| < n − t) and it follows from Lemma 7 that Comp(f(Sh2(m))) is a
random variable with min-entropy at least r log2(q/(q − 1)). Moreover,
Comp(f(Sh2(m))) is independent of the random variable Dg. Therefore,
in this case the probability that the check done using the compressor is





. Remember that if the check is
not satisfied then, HybmF outputs abort. Thus, we can define DF to output
always ⊥ and we get an error bounded by:
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RealmF :
Compute c(1) ← Sh2(m)
Sample k ← Fa
Compute z = (k, hk(c
(1))),Comp(c(1))
Compute z ← Realzg
If z =⊥ output ⊥
Otherwise
Parse z = (k ,h , c )
If h = hk (f(c
(1))) output ⊥
If c = Comp(f(c(1))) output ⊥
Output m = Rec2(f(c
(1)))
HybmF :
Compute c(1) ← Sh2(m)
Sample k ← Fa
Compute z = (k, hk(c
(1))),Comp(c(1))
Compute z ← Idealzg
If z =⊥ output ⊥
Otherwise
Parse z = (k ,h , c )
If h = hk (f(c
(1))) output ⊥
If c = Comp(f(c(1))) output ⊥
Output m = Rec2(f(c
(1)))
Fig. 7. On the right, the definition of the random variable HybmF for an input message
m ∈ Fk and a tampering function F = (f, g) ∈ F q1,n × F . On the left, for a quick
reference, the random variable RealmF (defined in Sect. 2) for the scheme (ENC2,DEC2).
We are now ready to state the main result about linear-time NM codes that we
present in this paper:
Theorem 4 (Linear-Time and Optimal-Rate NM codes). Suppose that
there exists real number α ∈ (0, 2) such that for any positive integer b there
exists a (b′, b)-NM-code (Enc,Dec) with respect of a family F , with error (b) =
negl(b) (the error is a negligible function of the message length) and b′ = O(bα),
then the following holds. For any positive integer k large enough, there exists an
(N, k)-NM code (ENC2,DEC2) with respect of the family F q1,n ×F and with error
negligible in k. Furthermore N = k + o(k) and, if the computational complexity
of (Enc,Dec) is sub-quadratic in b, then (ENC2,DEC2) is linear-time.
Proof. Instantiate Construction 2 with the LSSS from Lemma 6, the compressor
from Lemma 8 and the universal family from Lemma 9. More details in [23].
Corollary 4 (Binary Case for Construction 2). For any large enough k,
there exists linear-time binary (N, k)-NM code with respect of the family F 21,N
and with error negligible in k. Furthermore, N = k + o(k).
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A Appendix
A.1 Tellegen’s Principle
We will briefly discuss a technique know as Tellegen’s principle. Assume that we
are given a linear algorithm T computing the function f(x ) = x ·A, where A is a
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m×n matrix over some ring R and x is a vector from Rn. Then we can transform
T into an algorithm T′ computing the function f ′(y) = y · A, where y ∈ Rm
and A is the transpose of the matrix A, which has the same computational
complexity as T. We will discuss this transformation for arithmetic circuits. We
can decompose a circuit into a sequence of elementary instructions φi, where
each φi is a linear transformation on all the wires. We can thus write the matrix
A as A = φn · φn−1 · · ·φ2 · φ1. Transposing A immediately yields A = φ1 ·
φ2 · · ·φn−1 · φn . Thus, we only have to consider the effect of transposition to
the elementary instructions φi.
– Instruction φi multiplies a wire x with a constant α ∈ R and writes the output
in the same register. In this case φi = φi, as the transformation matrix φi is
diagonal and thus symmetric.
– Instruction φi adds wire y to wire x . In this case φi adds wire x to wire y .
These two instructions are sufficient to implement any linear transformation. For
instance, to clear an (auxiliary) register, simply multiply it by 0. We summarize
this in the following Lemma.
Lemma 10 (Tellegen’s Principle [42]). Let T(x) be a linear arithmetic cir-
cuit or linear RAM algorithm computing the function x · A. Then there exists
a linear arithmetic circuit T′(y) that computes the function y · A and has the
same computational complexity as T.
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